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Canada: A Comparison
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, in the case of United States v. Leon,' the United States
Supreme Court created the good faith exception to the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule. The Court ruled admissible illegal
drugs seized by the police pursuant to a warrant for which the police
had failed to establish probable cause.2 In a companion case, Massa-
* Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminal Justice,
Montana State University. B.S., Washington State University, 1962; LL.B., University of Ore-
gon, 1965; M.P.A., University of Illinois, 1975. The author expresses his appreciation to the
Government of Canada, which supported this research; to Professor Hamar Foster, Faculty of
Law, University of Victoria; and to Stephen Ungar, Honors Program at Montana State Uni-
versity, who read earlier versions of this Article.
1. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The Court in Leon reaffirmed that the exclusionary rule is judi-
cially created, and that the question of whether the Fourth Amendment is violated is different
from the question of whether the evidence obtained as a result of that violation should be
admitted at trial.
2. The Leon decision and its underlying rationale have been extensively criticized. See,
e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, "The Seductive Call of Expediency'" United States v. Leon, Its Ration-
ale and Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 895; William J. Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom,
The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the
Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365 (1981); Craig M. Bradley, The "Good-Faith Exception" Cases: Reason-
able Exercise in Futility, 60 IND. L.J. 287 (1984-85); Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95
YALE L.J. 906 (1986). Scholars argue that, given the common-sense criteria for determining
probable cause developed in Gates v. Illinois, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), good faith will rarely be
used. A major criticism of Leon is that, if the Court had used the Gates approach, it could
have easily held that the application for the warrant contained sufficient information to estab-
lish probable cause. Some state courts have refused to imply a good faith doctrine in their
constitutional equivalents to the Fourth Amendment. For example, in State v. Houston, 359
N.W.2d 336 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), the Minnesota Court of Appeals refused to apply the good
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chusetts v. Sheppard,3 the Court refused to suppress evidence found
during the execution of a warrant that failed to name the items to be
seized. Three years later, the Court allowed the admission of evidence
that was seized by an officer while conducting a warrantless adminis-
trative search, pursuant to a statute that was later declared unconsti-
tutional. 4 In all three cases, the searches violated the Fourth
Amendment. However, the evidence was in each case admitted be-
cause the officers acted in objective good faith.5
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court of Canada decided R. v. Ther-
ens,6 the first decision excluding evidence under section 24 of the
faith doctrine to warrantless searches; in State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987), the
Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected the good faith doctrine; and in Stringer v. State, 491 So.
2d 837 (Miss. 1986), the Mississippi Supreme Court declined to adopt a good faith doctrine.
3. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
4. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987). The Illinois statute not only failed to provide
for a warrant but permitted unbridled police discretion in deciding when to search. Id. at 359.
5. A distinction is made between good faith in determining the reasonableness of the
search and good faith acts that would permit use of the evidence seized by a search that vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment. In the United States, good faith on the part of the officer may
make the execution of the search reasonable. In Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987), for
example, police officers executed a warrant in the wrong third floor apartment, mistakenly
believing that there was only one apartment located on that floor. In Michigan v. DeFillippo,
443 U.S. 31 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held that an arrest and subsequent search
were reasonable when officers acting in good faith and with sufficient probable cause arrested a
suspect for violating an ordinance later declared unconstitutional. Cf Illinois v. Rodriquez,
497 U.S. 177 (1990) (warrantless entry is valid when based upon the consent of a third party
who the police, at the time of entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the
premises, but who in fact does not).
6. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (Can.).
The Supreme Court of Canada does not originate in the Constitution of Canada, but
section 101 gives Parliament the power to create Courts of Appeal for Canada. Parliament
created two courts, the Supreme Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Canada. Provinces
have the power to create their own courts. Nevertheless, the court system in Canada, unlike
the dual court system in the United States, is unitary. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Can-
ada has the power to review acts of Parliament and laws enacted by the provincial legislatures
without the parties having to demonstrate a federal issue, as is the case in the United States.
Furthermore, there is no case and controversy limitation on the Supreme Court of Canada.
Although most appeals to the high court have the benefit of a trial and one review, the court is
authorized to hear reference appeals. The federal government or a provincial government can
refer pending legislation to the Supreme Court of Canada and ask for its opinion on whether
the particular governmental unit, provincial or federal, has authority to enact the subject mat-
ter of the legislation. The government can also ask the Supreme Court for an opinion as to
whether the legislation violates the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. CAN. CONST. (Constitu-
tion Act 1984) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) [hereinafter Charter];
Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., ch. S-19, § 55 (1970) (Can.). For a history of the Supreme Court
of Canada, see JAMES G. SNELL & FREDERICK VAUGHAN, THE SUPREME COURT OF CAN-
ADA: HISTORY OF THE INSTITUTION (1985).
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Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 7 Section 24 provides:
(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this
Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of
competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court consid-
ers appropriate and just in the circumstances.
(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court con-
cludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or
denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evi-
dence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all
the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would
bring the administration of justice into disrepute.8
In determining whether the infringement of a Charter right
brought the administration of justice into disrepute, Justice Gerald Le
Dain, dissenting in Therens, asserted that judges must consider
whether the Charter violation "was committed in good faith or was
inadvertent or of a merely technical nature, or whether it was deliber-
ate, wilful or flagrant." 9 Subsequent decisions accepted Justice Le
Dain's position and signalled that good faith is an important, if not
determinative, factor in deciding whether evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the Charter is admissible at trial. 10
This Article compares the application of the good faith doctrine
of the United States and Canada in decisions admitting into or ex-
cluding from criminal trials evidence seized in violation of the United
States Constitution or the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
First, this Article examines some structural differences between the
United States' Bill of Rights and Canada's Charter, and compares the
policies underlying the applicable Charter sections with relevant
amendments to the United States Constitution. Then, the Article ex-
7. Charter, supra note 6, § 24. In 1982, the government of Canada constitutionalized
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. For a history of the constitution, see EDWARD MC-
WHINNEY, CANADA AND THE CONSTITUTION 1979-1982: PATRIATION AND THE CHARTER
OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS (1982). Prior to the Charter, the only ground for striking down
legislation was that the legislation had been enacted by the wrong level of government. British
North American Act, 1867, R.S.C. app. 5 (1970) (Can.). This led to a number of decisions
resolving civil liberty issues using the language of federalism. See Gerald V. La Forest, The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: An Overview, 61 CAN. B. REV. 19 (1983). The
Charter owes some of its substance to the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution.
Perhaps more important, the Charter is modeled after the European Covenant on Human
Rights and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. Peter W. Hogg, Can-
ada's New Charter of Rights, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 283, 286 & n.18 (1984).
8. Charter, supra note 6, § 24.
9. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 652 (emphasis added).
10. See, e.g., R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, 278 (Can.).
1992]
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plores the history of Canada's section 24(2), the interpretation of its
language, and the application of the rule in the context of good faith.
II. CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS:
STRUCTURAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Structural Considerations
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is much longer
and contains more substantive rights than the United States' Bill of
Rights." More important, the Charter contains its own limitation 12
and remedy 13 clauses. In particular, section 114 ensures that enumer-
ated rights can only be limited to the extent that the limitation is "de-
monstrably justified in a free and democratic society.' 15 Determining
whether a challenged statute is consistent with the Charter is a two-
step process. First, a court must conclude that the challenged legisla-
tion violates a Charter right. The focus then shifts to an examination
of1 whether the party, frequently the government, seeking a limitation
of the right has demonstrably justified the restriction. 16 If the party
11. The rights enumerated in the Charter are categorized into Fundamental Freedoms
(freedoms of speech and association), Democratic Rights (right to vote), Mobility Rights (per-
mitting movement from one province to another), Legal Rights (rights of the criminal defend-
ant), Equality Rights (prohibiting discrimination and allowing affirmative action), and Official
Languages of Canada (French and English given equal status in Canada and the province of
New Brunswick). Charter, supra note 6, §§ 2-22. In the United States, some of these explicit
rights have been given force through interpretation of the Bill of Rights. For an overview of
the rights enumerated in the Canadian Charter, see GERALD A. BEAUDOIN & ED RATUSHNY,
THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS (2d ed. 1989).
12. Charter, supra note 6, § 1.
13. Id. § 24; see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
14. Section 1 reads, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." Charter, supra note 6, § 1.
15. Id. The limit will be prescribed by law within the meaning of section 1 if it is ex-
pressly provided for by statute or regulation, or results by necessary implication from the
terms of a statute or regulation or from its operating requirements. The limit may also result
from the application of common law. See Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 618.
16. R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 112 (Can.). In Oakes, the Court developed two
central criteria that must be satisfied to establish a reasonable limit. First, the objective of the
legislation must be sufficiently important to warrant overriding a constitutional protection.
Second, the means chosen to achieve the objective must be reasonable and demonstrably justi-
fied. Id.
In finding reasonable limits, the courts have not always applied these stringent criteria in
a manner that squares with the Oakes requirement. Section 24(2), however, has been applied
rather broadly. This difference suggests that parties are in a better position using § 24(2) to
suppress evidence than challenging the constitutionality of legislation. See Keith B. Jobson,
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Section 24(2), in WILLIAM H. CHARLES ET
AL., EVIDENCE AND THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 199-200 (1989).
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succeeds in justifying the limitation, the legislation is saved; but if the
party fails to carry the burden, the statute is declared of no force or
effect.1 7 The admissibility at trial of any evidence obtained pursuant
to an unconstitutional statute hinges on an analysis of section 24(2).
The federal Parliament and provincial legislatures can insulate
legislation from Charter attack by using the override power in section
33.18 This power allows legislatures to review and overrule judgments
of the judiciary and, at the same time, maintain the ideology of parlia-
mentary supremacy.19 This section has a direct relationship to section
24(2). A legislative body could enact a statute permitting, for exam-
ple, the police to search for evidence without reasonable grounds if
the legislation clearly indicated that the law was enacted notwith-
standing the relevant Charter section. 20 The result of invoking section
17. Section 52(1) of the Charter expressly provides that enactments inconsistent with the
Charter are void: "The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that
is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of
no force or effect." Charter, supra note 6, § 52(1). Section 32 of the Charter applies the Char-
ter to laws and acts of Parliament and the government of Canada, and the legislatures and the
governments of each province. Id. § 32(1).
18. Section 33(1) states, "Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly de-
clare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a
provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7
to 15 of this Charter." Charter, supra note 6, § 33(1).
This section applies only to selected Charter rights. Moreover, the override is limited to
five years, but can be renewed for an additional five years. Id § 33(3). Furthermore, prov-
inces cannot opt out of federal law. Unlike the United States' system, Parliament or provincial
legislatures can enact legislation violating the Charter and then insulate that legislation from
Charter attack by invoking section 33.
19. In 1982, the Quebec National Assembly repealed all existing statutes and immedi-
ately reenacted them with a general override clause that read: "This Act shall operate notwith-
standing the provisions of sections 2 and 7 to 15 of the Constitution Act, 1982." The Quebec
Court of Appeal held that this general application of section 33 violated the intent and express
language of the section. See Alliance des Professeurs de Montreal v. A.G. Quebec, 21
D.L.R.4th 354 (1985) (Can.); BEAUDOIN & RATUSHNY, supra note 11, at 105-06. Recently,
the Quebec National Assembly used section 33 to enact a French language-only advertising
law after the Supreme Court had already struck down similar legislation as violative of section
2 of the Charter, which guarantees the freedoms of conscience, religion, expression, assembly,
and association. See Ford v. A.G. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (Can.); Lorraine E. Weinrib,
Learning to Live with the Override, 35 McGILL L.J. 541 (1990). The Saskatchewan legislature
also used section 33 to override a decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal that upheld
the right to strike as part of the freedom of association found in section 2. The Supreme Court
of Canada upheld the right to strike under section 2, but found that the legislation ordering the
strikers back to work was a reasonable limit within the meaning of section 1. Saskatchewan v.
Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union, Locals 544, 635, & 955, 38 D.L.R.4th 277 (1987)
(Can.).
20. The example assumes that the legislature had authority under the Constitution Act,
1982 to enact the legislation. If not, the Supreme Court of Canada would strike down the
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33 is to suspend the application of the Charter, including section
24(2).21
In cases where law enforcement officers obtained evidence in a
manner that violated a Charter right,22 section 24(2) requires judges
to suppress such evidence if the party seeking exclusion establishes
that it is more probable than not that the admission of the evidence at
trial would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 23
Although the remedy afforded in section 24(2) applies to a breach of
any Charter right, the section's practical impact is most evident when
the legal rights enumerated in sections 8, 9, 10(b), and 7 are
violated. 24
B. Policy Considerations Underlying Sections 8, 9, 10(b), and 7
In Hunter v. Southam Inc. ,25 the Supreme Court of Canada held
that the Charter must be given a purposive interpretation. 26 The
Court not only applied a strict, textual analysis, but also examined the
legislation on the ground that it was beyond the governmental body's power to enact legisla-
tion. See supra notes 6 and 7.
21. BEAUDOIN & RATUSHNY, supra note 11, at 106.
22. The phrase "obtained in the manner," according to some scholars, required the ac-
cused to show a causal connection between the Charter breach and the discovery of the evi-
dence. In R. v. Strachan, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980 (Can.), the Supreme Court of Canada rejected
this position and held that only a temporal relationship between the Charter breach and the
discovery of evidence is needed. Chief Justice Dickson was careful to note that the presence of
a temporal connection is not always determinative. Id. at 1005. Situations will arise, he sug-
gested, where evidence following the breach of a Charter right will be too remote from the
violation to be "obtained in a manner" that infringed the Charter. Id. at 1006.
An example of such a lack of temporal relationship is found in R. v. Upston, [1988] 1
S.C.R. 1083 (Can.). In Upston, the officers detained the accused without informing him of his
right to retain and instruct counsel as required by section 10(b) of the Charter. After the
arrest, the officers read the section 10(b) warning and obtained incriminating statements. The
Supreme Court, in a short opinion, found no temporal relationship between the Charter breach
and the second confession.
23. Professor MacCrimmon argues that, although the burden rests on the party seeking
to exclude evidence to show that the police activities could bring the administration of justice
into disrepute, the Crown should present evidence of good faith. M.T. MacCrimmon, Develop-
ments in the Law of Evidence: The 1986-87 Term, 10 Sup. CT. L. REV. 225 (1989). The
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal agreed with this position and held that the Crown must present
evidence of good faith. R. v. Pastro, 42 C.C.C.3d 485 (Sask. C.A. 1988).
24. In contrast, in the United States the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments have different exclusionary rules that reflect and protect the different values un-
derlying each amendment. In Canada, there is only one exclusionary rule, but this difference
may not be as dramatic as it first seems. The Supreme Court of Canada's interpretation means
that the decision about whether to exclude evidence depends on the underlying policy pro-
tected by the particular Charter section that was breached.
25. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (Can.).
26. Id. at 156.
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interests and policies underlying the Charter section in question.
Thus, the Court's decision whether to exclude evidence from trial de-
pends heavily on the values and policies that a particular section
protects.
Section 8, which is similar to the Fourth Amendment, affords
everyone the right to be secure against unreasonable searches or
seizures. 27 The section neither requires search warrants nor provides
a standard to measure reasonableness. 28 The Supreme Court of Can-
ada, giving section 8 a purposive analysis, ruled that it protects peo-
ple, not places, and, at a minimum, secures a reasonable expectation
of privacy.29 The Court reasoned that the only effective protection for
27. Charter, supra note 6, § 8.
28. Id. Courts must first determine whether an unlawful search is unreasonable. If of-
ficers obtain evidence during an unlawful search, but the court does not deem it unreasonable
within the meaning of section 8, the evidence is admissible at trial.
In Canada, there are numerous statutory provisions governing search warrants. Section
487 of the Criminal Code authorizes a justice of the peace to issue a search warrant for any
offense violating the Criminal Code. Common law governs warrantless searches, unless au-
thorized by the Criminal Code. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 34, § 487 (1985) (Can.). There are
a number of sections in the Criminal Code specifically allowing officers to search without war-
rants. Section 103(2), for example, permits officers to seize a firearm if there are reasonable
grounds to believe that a person should not have a firearm in his or her custody for the per-
son's own safety. Id. § 103(2). A similar provision allows warrantless searches of any bawdy
or gaming house. Id. § 199(2).
Federal law in Canada contains a number of search warrant provisions. The Constitution
Act gives the federal government exclusive jurisdiction to enact criminal law, but empowers
the provinces to enforce the Criminal Code. The federal government enforces federal law.
The Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C., ch. N-1 (1985), the Food and Drug Act, R.S.C., ch. F-27
(1985), the Fish Inspection Act, R.S.C., ch. F-12 (1985), and the Excise Act, R.S.C., ch. E-14
(1985), for example, permit warranted and warrantless searches. The Narcotic Control Act
gives officers broad powers to conduct searches. Section 10 of the Act reads:
A peace officer may, at any time, without a warrant, enter and search any place other
than a dwelling-house, and under the authority of a writ of assistance or a warrant
issued under section 12 or 13, enter and search any dwelling-house if the peace officer
believes on reasonable grounds there is, in the place or dwelling-house, a narcotic by
means of or in respect of which an offence under this Act has been committed. The
warrant must be directed to a specific officer who must control the search process.
Narcotics Control Act, R.S.C., ch. N-1, § 10 (1985) (Can.).
Until recently, police officers investigating violations of federal law had to adhere to the
particular law's search and seizure requirements. The search provisions of the Narcotic Con-
trol Act, for example, govern searches for narcotics. Id. Similarly, the Criminal Code's search
warrant provisions at one time governed searches for evidence that occurred in the course of
investigating crimes enumerated in the Criminal Code. Recent amendments to the search war-
rant section of the Criminal Code provide that warrants can be issued for any offenses in the
Code or "any other Act of Parliament." Criminal Amendment Act, R.S.C., ch. C-19, § 68
(1985) (Can.). The courts interpret this language to mean that officers can obtain search war-
rants under the authority of the Criminal Code while investigating crimes covered by other
federal laws. See infra note 110.
29. The Supreme Court of Canada followed the United States Supreme Court's holding
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this expectation was to prevent unjustified searches before they oc-
curred. Thus, warrantless searches are prima facie "unreasonable,"
and prior authorization for the search is necessary whenever feasible.
Nevertheless, warrantless searches are reasonable if they are author-
ized by law and if the law itself and the manner in which the search is
executed are reasonable.30 A statute authorizing a warrantless search
is reasonable if it includes a reasonable belief standard for the
search.
3'
When applying for search warrants, Canadian police officers
must present magistrates with sufficient information to enable an in-
dependent determination as to whether reasonable grounds exist to
conclude that an offense has been committed and that evidence will be
found at the place to be searched. 32 Thus, the Crown can interfere
with privacy interests when its agents have reasonable grounds to be-
lieve evidence of the crime is located in the place to be searched.
33
in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), when it decided R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R.
417, 428-29 (Can.). However, the Canadian Supreme Court went beyond Katz and identified a
number of privacy interests including spatial, informational, and personal interests. Dyment,
[1988] 2 S.C.R. at 429.
30. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 278.
31. R. v. Debot, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140 (Can.). In some initial Charter cases, the Court
adopted the notion that a violation of section 10(b) affected the reasonableness of the search.
In R. v. Simmons, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495 (Can.), and a companion case, R. v. Jacoy, [1988] 2
S.C.R. 548 (Can.), the manner of the search was unreasonable because officers detained Sim-
mons without giving her the necessary section 10(b) warning, conducted a strip search, and
seized narcotics. Simmons, [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 506-07. Nevertheless, the officers acted in good
faith because they relied on an accepted customs agency procedure. Id. at 534-45. Similarly,
in Jacoy, they relied on current Immigration Department policy. Jocoy, [1988] 2 S.C.R. at
560. The Simmons decision hinged on sections 143 and 144 of the Customs Act, R.S.C. ch. C-
40 (1969). Simmons, [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 524-25. This act authorizes a customs officer to search
any person if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person has goods subject to
entry at customs or prohibited goods secreted about his or her person. Customs Act, R.S.C.,
ch. C-58, § 143 (1970) (Can.). The Customs Act also provides that before a person can be
searched, he or she may ask to be taken before a magistrate, justice of the peace, or chief officer
at the port. Id. § 144. Although these rights were posted on the wall in Simmons, no evidence
suggested that Simmons read them. Simmons, [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 506-07. Under these circum-
stances, the court reasoned, the presence of counsel could have helped her understand her
statutory options. This case is not very common in most search situations. Id. at 530-31. The
Debot case more accurately represents the current retreat from the position that a violation of
section 10(b) affects the reasonableness of a subsequent search.
32. The official giving prior authorization for search warrants need not be a judge, but at
a minimum must be capable of acting judicially.
33. The United States Supreme Court has developed two standards under the Fourth
Amendment. The first is a probable cause standard that is similar to the reasonable grounds
test in Canada. The second is the reasonable suspicion standard. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985). The Supreme Court of
Canada has not adopted a reasonable suspicion standard similar to that of the United States.
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The Supreme Court of Canada has developed a hierarchy of
these privacy interests. In Hunter,34 the Court hinted that where the
interest involved is the protection of bodily integrity, the Court ap-
plies a more stringent test than the typical reasonable grounds crite-
ria. In a later decision, the Court held that "a violation of the sanctity
of a person's body is much more serious than that of his office or even
of his home."' 35 Protection of bodily integrity, therefore, seems to rest
at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of privacy interests.
Section 9 of the Charter promotes a reasonable expectation of
privacy by allowing Canadians freedom of movement without fear of
arbitrary detention or imprisonment. 36 Like section 8, section 9 does
not include a standard to measure whether a person was arbitrarily
detained or imprisoned. In R. v. Storrey,3 7 the Supreme Court of Can-
ada corrected this omission and applied the reasonable grounds stan-
dard found in the Criminal Code 38 to determine whether an arrest
was arbitrary within the meaning of section 9.39
Section 10(b) provides that everyone has the right upon arrest or
detention to retain and instruct counsel without delay, and to be in-
formed of that right. This section is the Canadian equivalent to the
34. [1984] 2 S.C.R. at 145.
35. R. v. Pohoretsky, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 945, 949 (Can.).
36. Section 9 of the Charter reads: "Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained
or imprisoned." Charter, supra note 6, § 9.
37. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241 (Can.).
38. Criminal Code § 495 differentiates between indictable and summary conviction of-
fenses in terms of police arrest power. A police officer can arrest without a warrant any person
whom the officer reasonably believes has committed an indictable offense. An officer may not
make a warrantless arrest for a summary conviction offense in instances where the officer has a
reasonable belief that the public interest may be satisfied without arresting the subject. Indict-
able offenses are comparable to felonies, and summary conviction offenses equate to
misdemeanors.
39. Storrey, [1988] 1 S.C.R. at 256. The Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Hufsky,
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 621 (Can.), and R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257 (Can.), held that sec-
tion 198a(l) of the Highway Traffic Act, permits arbitrary stops of motorists, which violated
section 9 of the Charter. The difference in the two cases lies in the fact that in Hufsky, the stop
was made as part of a "spot check" program, but in Ladouceur, the stop was not part of any
organized program. Nevertheless, both courts found the legislation demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society within the meaning of section 1. In their analyses of section 1, the
Canadian justices expressly rejected the United States Supreme Court's majority opinion in
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), which held that stopping an automobile is a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment and that detaining the driver to check his or her driver's license
and automobile registration is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, unless the stop-
ping officer has at least an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the motorist is unlicensed
or the automobile is unregistered. In the United States, motorists have a diminished expecta-
tion of privacy. For example, a state is allowed to establish sobriety checkpoints. See Michi-
gan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
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United States' Miranda4 o warnings. The subsection requires that de-
tained suspects be informed of their right to counsel without delay,
including a legal aid lawyer if so needed. 41 The Supreme Court of
Canada defines detention as a restraint of liberty other than an arrest,
or control over the movement of a person by a demand that may have
significant legal consequences and that prevents or impedes access to
counsel, or a refusal to comply with a demand for which a citizen is
criminally liable.42  This broad definition has led Canadian courts to
require section 10(b) warnings much earlier in the process than those
prescribed by Miranda.43
In addition to administering the warnings, Canadian police of-
ficers must provide a reasonable opportunity for the detainee to obtain
counsel and must cease questioning until the suspect has had an op-
portunity to contact a lawyer." Detainees, on the other hand, must
make a reasonable effort to contact an attorney,45 but they may waive
their right to retain and instruct counsel.46
The values protected by section 10(b) are strikingly similar to
40. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
41. In R. v. Brydges, [19901 1 S.C.R. 190 (Can.), the Supreme Court of Canada held that
a detainee who expresses concern about affording a lawyer must be informed of the existence of
legal aid. Id. at 206. Justice Lamer, however, drew a "bright line," and suggested that the
police must routinely advise detainees about the availability of legal aid as part of the section
10(b) caution. Id. As a result, detainees in Canada, but not in the United States, must be
advised of the availability of legal aid. The Charter does not guarantee the right to counsel at
trial. The right, if it exists, is determined by the legal aid statutes of each province. It seems
likely, however, that if presented with the issue, the Supreme Court of Canada would find a
right to counsel at trial in section 7.
42. Thomsen, [1988] 1 S.C.R. at 649.
43. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda warnings, designed to
protect the Fifth Amendment privilege, are required when law enforcement officers conduct a
custodial interrogation. Id. at 444. Section 10(b) can be examined more accurately in terms of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The right to counsel in Canada attaches on detention,
whereas in the United States, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches when the state
decides to prosecute by filing formal charges. Some American scholars argue that the right
should attach at the time of the arrest. See, e.g., James J. Tomkovicz, An Adversary System
Defense -of the Right to Counsel Against Informants: Truth, Fair Play, and the Massiah Doc-
trine, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (1988).
44. R. v. Manninen, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233, 1243-44 (Can.).
45. In R. v. Smith, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 368, 387 (Can.), the Court refused to find a section
10(b) violation when the detainee failed to make a reasonable effort to contact counsel.
46. In R. v. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383 (Can.), the Supreme Court of Canada adopted
the "awareness of the consequences" test as the proper standard to determine a waiver under
section 10(b). For a comparison of the waiver requirements in the United States and Canada,
see Robert Harvie & Hamer Foster, Ties That Bind? The Supreme Court of Canada, American
Jurisprudence, and the Revision of Canadian Criminal Law Under the Charter, 28 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 730 (1990).
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those secured by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination protects a central feature of the adversary system in that
the accused cannot be compelled to contribute to his conviction.
47
Moreover, the privilege prevents cruelty, ensures that suspects are
treated with dignity, and promotes the search for truth by confirming
that confessions are trustworthy.48 In Sixth Amendment jurispru-
dence, the right to counsel promotes a fair trial, preserves the adver-
sary system, and provides legal assistance to the accused when
confronted with the power of the state.
49
The Supreme Court of Canada likewise stated that the right to
counsel promotes fair treatment of the accused in situations entailing
a "significant legal consequence." 50 Moreover, section 10(b) man-
dates a fair administration of the adversary system by allowing detain-
ees to seek the assistance of counsel to safeguard their legal interests.
Without this protection, detainees lose the presumption of innocence,
and, moreover, must take the stand to counter the damaging state-
ments.51 Justice Wilson summarized the Supreme Court of Canada's
view of the right's importance, stating that "[t]he fairness of the trial
would be adversely affected since the admission of the statement
would infringe on the appellant's right against self-incrimination, a
right which could have been protected had the appellant had an op-
47. Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Supreme Court of Canada has out-
lined precisely the values protected by the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to
counsel. See generally MARK BERGER, TAKING THE FIFTH: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (1980); Peter B. Michalyshyn, The Charter Right
to Counsel: Beyond Miranda, 25 ALTA. L. REV. 190 (1986); Dale Gibson, Shocking the Public:
Early Indications of the Meaning of "Disrepute" in Section 24(2) of the Charter, 13 MAN. L.
REV. 495 (1983).
48. Other values have been identified as being protected by the privilege, but these values
are beyond the scope of this Article. See generally George E. Dix, Federal Constitutional Con-
fession Law: The 1986 and 1987 Supreme Court Terms, 67 TEX. L. REV. 231 (1988); LEONARD
W. LEVY, THE ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMI-
NATION (1968); BERGER, supra note 47. Recently, the United States Supreme Court applied
the harmless error doctrine to coerced confessions. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct.
1246 (1991).
49. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-99 (1977); see also Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S.
159, 168-69 (1985); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964) (quoting Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967). For a
general discussion of the scope of the Sixth Amendment, see Tomkovicz, supra note 43.
50. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 394; see also Michalyshyn, supra note 47, at 194.
51. R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 (Can.). Justice Sopinka, in a concurring opinion,
suggested that evidence obtained in violation of the right to counsel effectively strips the ac-
cused of the presumption of innocence "because he has damned himself in the eyes of the trier
of fact." Id. at 207.
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portunity to consult counsel." '52
Section 7 resembles the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Section 7
ensures that "everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of the
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice." 53 In interpreting the sec-
tion, the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized that each right-life,
liberty, and security of the person-carries meaning in itself. In addi-
tion, the Court contended that the words "principles of fundamental
justice" represent only qualifiers characterizing the rights to life, lib-
erty, and security of the person, and not separate rights. 54 Moreover,
the rights protected by section 7 are broader than those guaranteed by
the enumerated rights and originate, according to the Court, "in the
basic tenets and principles of our legal system." 55
The case of R. v. Hebert 56 represents an example of the Supreme
Court of Canada's method of analyzing the basic tenets of the legal
system to determine the scope of the right to silence, which is not
enumerated in the Charter.5 7 Hebert was arrested and given a section
10(b) warning. He consulted a lawyer, and afterwards declined to
52. R. v. Black, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 138, 160 (Can.).
53. Section 7 differs from the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution in two respects. First, section 7 does not protect
property. Second, section 7 does not guarantee Canadian citizens the right to "due process of
law." These omissions were intentional. During the debate over the Charter, the maritime
provinces, fearful of non-resident ownership of land, objected to property protection under the
Charter. The New Democratic Party was fearful that property protection might prohibit the
governments of Canada and the provinces from nationalizing corporations. To gain these
groups' support, the federal government removed the term "property" from section 7.
The phrase "due process of law" was omitted for fear that the Canadian Supreme Court
might interpret the expression to include the United States' notion of substantive due process,
thereby subjecting Canadian social programs to review in which they could be declared in
violation. The Charter's framers believed that the phrase "principles of fundamental justice"
would limit interpretation of the section to procedural matters. However, the Supreme Court
of Canada held that section 7 applies in examining the substance of legislation. In addition,
the framers' intentions are admissible to interpret Charter sections. In re Section 94(2) of the
Motor Vehicle Act 1985, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 490 (Can.).
54. Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, 204 (Can.).
55. In re Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. at 503. This case is an example of the
Supreme Court of Canada's reference jurisdiction. The Province of British Columbia asked the
Court to determine the constitutionality of a statute that prohibited driving with an expired
license without proof of mens rea and included jail as punishment. The Court held that the
statute breached section 7 of the Charter.
56. [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 (Can.).
57. The Crown found, and the defense agreed, that section 7 contained a right to silence.
However, the defense disagreed with the Crown as to its scope. Id. at 161.
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speak with police. The police placed Hebert in a jail cell, where an
undercover officer later joined him and elicited incriminating state-
ments. In analyzing the scope of Hebert's rights, the Court explored
the basic tenets of the legal system, including the Canadian confession
rule, the right against self-incrimination,58 and the right to counsel. 59
The Court subsequently concluded that the right to silence extended
to this factual situation.60
In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Canada developed rights
beyond those enumerated in the Charter and provided additional safe-
guards to values already embraced by the enumerated Charter rights.
These values become crucial in analyzing the exclusionary rule and
the good faith doctrine in Canada. It is doubtful, however, that the
Charter's framers intended this result.
III. THE CANADIAN EXCLUSIONARY RULE: A HISTORY
The language currently found in section 24(2) first appeared in a
pre-Charter case, R. v. Wray.61 The case questioned the admissibility
of derivative evidence obtained as a result of an involuntary confes-
sion.62 In his statement, Wray revealed to investigators the location
of the murder weapon and then later led them to the murder scene.
63
58. Id at 164. The Charter's right against self-incrimination only applies at trial. Sec-
tion 11 (c) states, "Any person charged with an offence has the right not to be compelled to be a
witness in proceedings against that person in respect of the offence." Charter, supra note 6,
§ 11(c). Section 13 of the Charter defines self-incrimination as follows: "A witness who testi-
fies in any proceedings has the right not to have any incriminating evidence so given used to
incriminate that witness in any other proceedings, except in a prosecution for perjury or for the
giving of contradictory evidence." Id. § 13.
59. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 176.
60. Id. at 186. The police are not required to inform detainees of their right to silence as
part of the section 10(b) caution. Nevertheless, police in Canada frequently warn detainees of
this right. In Hebert, the Court assumed that counsel would advise their clients of the right.
The Court also suggested that, although Hebert consulted an attorney, the police were not
precluded from subsequently attempting to question the accused. Id. at 180. Of course, the
police may not deny a detainee's access to counsel.
The United States Supreme Court has developed two approaches to police reinterroga-
tion. The Court has rejected an absolute prohibition on police reinterrogation. Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975). If, however, the suspect demands counsel, the police must
cease further interrogation unless the suspect initiates the conversation. Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 478 (1981); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
61. 1971 S.C.R. 272 (Can.).
62. Canadian courts accept the common law rule that involuntary confessions cannot be
used against the accused. This common law rule states that a confession is voluntary if it is
(1) obtained without threats or promises; (2) accepted by an individual the suspect believes to
be a person in authority; and (3) made with an operating mind.
63. Little Charter jurisprudence exists on the derivative evidence concept. In Black, the
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The Ontario trial judge refused to allow the Crown to introduce evi-
dence of the role the accused played in finding the weapon, and sup-
pressed the rifle, claiming that he possessed the discretion to exclude
improperly obtained evidence when that evidence would bring the ad-
ministration of justice into disrepute.64 The Supreme Court of Can-
ada disagreed. Justice Ronald Martland, writing for the majority,
declared that, "under our law, the function of the court is to deter-
mine the issue before it, on the evidence admissible in law, and it does
not extend to the exclusion of admissible evidence for any other rea-
son."16 5 Vigorous debate stemming from this decision kept the con-
cept of a discretionary exclusionary rule alive.
66
After the Wray decision, and before the passage of the Charter,
two Canadian commissions recommended a discretionary exclusion-
ary rule, albeit for different reasons. The Law Reform Commission of
Canada's Report of Evidence advocated a discretionary exclusionary
rule for Canada's evidence code. 67 The Commission was careful to
Supreme Court of Canada allowed into evidence a knife that was obtained after police elicited
a confession in violation of § 10(b). The Court suggested that the knife inevitably would have
been discovered. Black, [1989] 2 S.C.R. at 165.
64. R. v. Wray, [1970] 2 O.R. 3, 4-5 (Ont. C.A.). At the time of this decision, no Cana-
dian statutory or constitutional provision permitted the exclusion of evidence. Precedent did
exist, however, in the Scottish case, Lawrie v. Muri, 1950 J.C. 19 (H.C.J. Scot. 1949). See
Jobson, supra note 16, at 704. Two years after the Wray decision, Parliament enacted a statute
authorizing the exclusion of evidence. See infra note 71.
65. Wray, 1971 S.C.R. at 288. The Court held that those parts of an involuntary state-
ment substantiated by the police were admissible as evidence. Id. at 296 (citing The King v. St.
Lawrence, 1949 O.R. 215 (Can.)).
66. M.S. Weinberg, The Judicial Discretion to Exclude Relevant Evidence, 21 MCGILL
L.J. 1 (1975); Roger C. Gibson, Illegally Obtained Evidence, 3 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 23
(1973). Regardless of the criticisms leveled at the Wray decision, the Court reinforced its
holding when it ruled that evidence seized in violation of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights
would not be excluded. Hogan v. The Queen, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574, 585 (Can.). The Canadian
Bii! of Rights was enacted by Parliament in 1960 amid controversy between those who favored
relying upon the common law to protect personal rights and those who believed that a bill of
rights was more effective. Civil libertarians hoped that the Supreme Court of Canada would
give the new legislation a purposive interpretation, much like that now given by the Court in
Charttr litigation. However, they were disappointed. The Court was reluctant to use the
Canadian Bill of Rights to strike down legislation or administrative actions. WALTER TARNO-
POLSKY, THE CANADIAN BILL OF RIGHTS 14 (2d ed. 1975). The Court's cautious approach
gave added momentum to those who favored an entrenched Charter of Rights. See id. The
Canadian Bill of Rights is still in effect and is occasionally presented as an alternate argument
to the Charter.
67. LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, REPORT ON EVIDENCE (1975) [hereinafter
LAW REFORM]. The proposed legislation provided that "[e]vidence shall be excluded if it was
obtained under such circumstances that its use in the proceedings would tend to bring the
administration of justice into disrepute." Id. at 22. THE ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMIS-
SION, REPORT ON EVIDENCE (1976) adopted similar recommendations. This proposal stated
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point out that although exclusion was unlikely to be effective in con-
trolling or deterring improper police activity, courts must nonetheless
attempt to protect the integrity of the judicial process.
68
The McDonald Commission, established to investigate abuses
committed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police ("R.C.M.P."), ar-
gued that a discretionary exclusionary rule would deter police mis-
conduct. 69 The Commission discovered R.C.M.P. files purporting to
show that without judicial condemnation of unlawful police practices,
police officers believed that those practices were implicitly approved
by the judiciary. 70 An exclusionary rule, the McDonald Commission
argued, coupled with effective training, supervision, discipline, and
policy review, would deter police abuses and ensure that the judiciary
was not contributing to an improper police attitude.
71
R. v. Rothman 72 was the only pre-Charter case that explored the
meaning of the language subsequently adopted in section 24(2).
Rothman was arrested and given the standard warning that his state-
ments could be used against him.73 He informed the officers that he
did not want to talk to them. He was then placed in a jail cell, and
was later joined by an undercover officer who extracted damaging ad-
missions. The trial court excluded Rothman's confession, arguing
that to admit it would bring the administration of justice into disre-
pute. The majority of the Supreme Court rejected the trial judge's
decision.74 In a lengthy concurrence, Justice Antonio Lamer urged
that "[i]n a proceeding, the court may refuse to admit evidence that otherwise would be admis-
sible if the court finds that it was obtained by methods that are repugnant to the fair adminis-
tration of justice and likely to bring the administration of justice into disrepute." Id. at 94.
68. The Law Reform Commission emphasized that it was not recommending the United
States' model of exclusion as a deterrent. LAW REFORM, supra note 67, at 62. Rather, it
desired to restore what some thought was the common law discretionary rule. Id. This pro-
posed legislation was never enacted.
69. 2 COMMISSION OF INQUIRY CONCERNING CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF THE ROYAL CA-
NADIAN MOUNTED POLICE, FREEDOM AND SECURITY UNDER LAW 1044-46 (1981).
70. Id. at 1039-40.
71. Id. at 1046. In 1972, Parliament enacted an exclusionary rule as part of a statute
permitting wiretapping under certain conditions. The law gave trial judges discretion to ex-
clude evidence as a result of an illegal wiretap when its "admission would bring the administra-
tion of justice into disrepute." Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 189(2) (1985) (Can.).
72. [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640 (Can.). The case was overruled by Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. at
151.
73. Prior to the Charter, officers notified suspects that they were not obliged to make any
statement, but that anything they said could be used against them. This caution was not
mandatory but was considered as part of the totality of circumstances in determining whether
a confession was voluntary. See Rothman, [1981] 1 S.C.R. at 643.
74. The statement was made voluntarily because Rothman did not know he was speaking
to a person in authority. Id. at 644. The United States Supreme Court employed similar rea-
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the Court to adopt a "shock the community conscience" test 75 to de-
termine whether police activities brought the system of justice into
disrepute.
7 6
Although pre-Charter efforts failed to establish a limited exclu-
sionary rule, these endeavors indicate that some Canadians were sym-
pathetic to such a rule. Others were satisfied with the Wray concept
and strongly opposed any form of exclusionary rule in the Charter.
The first version of the Charter had a tone of civil libertarian-
ism. 77 The enforcement section left the remedy for Charter violations
to the judges' discretion as they deemed appropriate, and limited ap-
plication to the circumstances of the case before them.7 8 Provincial
leaders feared this broad language would lead to a rule similar to that
of the United States, and, in response, they proposed language prohib-
iting an exclusionary rule.79 Civil rights groups, the Canadian Bar
Association, and others objected vigorously to this prohibition. After
further debate, the government agreed to a provision directing courts
to exclude evidence when it would bring the administration of justice
into disrepute. This language reflected a compromise between those
soning in permitting the use of a confession that was obtained after an undercover agent was
sent into the defendant's jail cell. Illinios v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990).
75. The test is similar to the "shock the conscience of the court" test used by the United
States Supreme Court in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). See Gibson, supra
note 66, at 74.
76. Justice Lamer believed the trick used by the police probably did not shock the con-
science of the community. Rothman, [1981] 1 S.C.R. at 697. Two dissenting justices, Chief
Justice Laskin and Justice Estey, took the opposite view. They argued that ethical principles
are vital if a system of justice is to command the respect and support of the community. Ac-
cording to the dissenters, placing an undercover agent into Rothman's jail cell, after he explic-
itly refused to talk to the officers, prejudiced the public trust in the integrity of the judicial
process. Id. at 677-98. In July 1990, Justice Lamer was appointed Chief Justice of Canada.
77. Anne McLellan & Bruce P. Elman, The Enforcement of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms: An Analysis of Section 24, 21 ALTA. L. REV. 205 (1983); JOBSON, supra
note 16.
78. The proposed section stated that "[a]nyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed
by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction
to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances." This
language is now contained in § 24(1) of the Charter.
79. The proposed section stated that "[n]o provision of this Charter, other than section
13, affects the laws respecting the admissibility of evidence in any proceedings or the authority
of Parliament or a legislature to make laws in relation thereto." This proposal, if adopted,
would have cemented the Wray concept into the Canadian Constitution. McLellan & Elman,
supra note 77, at 207.
Section 13 provided that "[a] witness has the right when compelled to testify not to have
any incriminating evidence so given used to incriminate him or her in any other proceedings,
except in a prosecution for perjury or for the giving of contradictory evidence." This section in
modified form remained § 13 of the Charter. Charter, supra note 6, § 13.
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who favored retaining the Wray doctrine and those who favored
adopting a doctrine similar to the United States' exclusionary rule.80
During the debate on the Canadian Constitution before the Spe-
cial Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons, 81 propo-
nents of section 24(2) believed it would be used sparingly and only in
the most repugnant and objectionable cases of police abuse.82 The
"shock the community conscious" test, as developed in Rothman, was
thought to be the proper standard to measure whether admission of
illegally obtained evidence at trial would bring the system into disre-
pute.83 The framers did not foresee the Court's purposive interpreta-
tion of section 24(2), with its resulting broader application of the
exclusionary rule.8 4
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA'S INTERPRETATION OF
SECTION 24(2) OF THE CHARTER
A. Purpose of the Canadian Exclusionary Rule
The purpose of Canada's exclusionary rule is to protect the repu-
tation of the justice system. The Supreme Court of Canada has ada-
mantly claimed that the intention of section 24(2) is not to deter the
police. "The main reason for this," according to Justice Claire
L'Heureux Dube, "is that the price of exclusion is not paid by the
police, and that consequently, from the police point of view, exclusion
generally would amount to no punishment at all."'8 5 At most, the
80. David M. Paciocco, The Judicial Repeal of s. 24(2) and the Development of the Cana-
dian Exclusionary Rule, 32 CRIM. L.Q. 326 (1990).
81. MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS AND EVIDENCE OF THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE OF
THE SENATE AND OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA (1980)
[hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE]. The Committee was established to take testimony from vari-
ous interest groups concerning the proposed Charter.
82. Paciocco, supra note 80 (arguing that the section was intended to be used sparingly
and only in narrow circumstances).
83. Rothman v. R., 59 C.C.C.2d 30 (Can.). One witness before the Special Joint Com-
mittee testified that the standard for determining whether evidence brought the administration
of justice into disrepute was whether "the admission of this evidence would make me vomit,
[because] it was obtained in such a reprehensible manner." JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 81,
at 179 (testimony of Mr. Ewaskchuk).
84. There is disagreement in Canada about the scope of the exclusionary rule. Professor
Paciocco contends that the Court has gone too far in its interpretation of the rule. Paciocco,
supra note 80, at 326. Professor Elman argues that the impact of the Court's interpretation
has not extended much beyond Wray, and that confessions are excluded from trial, but real
evidence is not. See Bruce P. Elman, Returning to Wray: Some Recent Cases on Section 24 of
the Charter, 26 ALTA. L. REV. 604 (1988).
85. R. v. Duguay, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 93, 123 (Can.). In excluding the evidence in Duguay,
the Ontario Court of Appeal had used "blind eye" reasoning, which posits that if courts turn a
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Court hopes that its decisions will foster a positive attitude on the part
of the police toward Charter rights.
Certainly, police misconduct may bring the administration of
justice into disrepute. But the purpose of section 24(2) is to prevent
the administration of justice from being brought into further disrepute
by the admission of the evidence at trial. Therefore, the rule is aimed
at protecting the reputation of the judicial system by safeguarding the
fairness of the trial.
86
B. Factors in Determining Whether to Apply the Exclusionary Rule
Justice Lamer, writing for the majority in R. v. Collins,8 7 the
seminal case interpreting section 24(2), rejected the "shock the com-
munity conscience" test. Justice Lamer developed a lower threshold
to determine whether admitting evidence could bring the administra-
tion of justice into disrepute.88 According to Justice Lamer, the rele-
vant question for judges is: "Would the admission of evidence bring
the administration of justice into disrepute in the eyes of the reason-
able man, dispassionate and fully apprised of the circumstances of the
case?" 8 9 This question is not answered by polling community mem-
bers or consulting the public.9° The Charter was designed to protect
blind eye to police misconduct, the police may assume that they have the courts' tacit approval
to continue the activity. R. v. Duguay, 18 C.C.C.3d 289 (Can.). Upon review, the majority of
the Supreme Court of Canada seemed to agree with this reasoning when, in a short opinion,
they stated, "The Court of Appeal did not enunciate any principle with which we disagree."
Duguay, [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 89. Blind eye reasoning was also used by the McDonald Commis-
sion. See supra note 69.
86. Collins, [19871 1 S.C.R. at 282.
87. Id.
88. Id Justice Lamer gave two reasons for rejecting the test he developed in Rothman.
First, Justice Lamer stated that breaches of the Charter are violations of the most important
law in the land. Second, he adopted the French version of § 24(2), which is less onerous than
the English text. The English text uses the phrase "would bring the administration of justice
into disrepute," while the French reading, "es susceptible de deconsiderer l'adminstration de la
justice," translates as "could bring the administration of justice into disrepute."
89. Id. This test was first recommended by Professor Yves-Marie Morissette, The Exclu-
sion Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: What to Do and What Not to Do, 29
MCGILL L.J. 521 (1984).
90. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 282. Professor Gibson suggested the use of public opinion
polls to help courts determine whether members of the community believed that a Charter
breach brought the administration of justice into disrepute. See Dale Gibson, Determining
Disrepute: Opinion Polls and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 61 CAN. B. REv.
377 (1983). One study indicated that the Canadian public considers the criteria used by judges
to exclude evidence satisfactory. Alan W. Bryant et al., Public Attitudes Toward the Exclusion
of Evidence: Section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 69 CANADIAN B.
REV. 1 (1990).
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the accused from the majority; its enforcement, Justice Lamer argued,
cannot be left to the majority. Its enforcement is in the hands of
judges who, taking into consideration all factors, can best determine
whether, in the eyes of a reasonable, dispassionate person, the admis-
sion of the evidence would bring the justice system into disrepute.
Justice Lamer divided these factors into three categories: fair-
ness of the trial, seriousness of the Charter breach, and the long-term
effects on the administration of justice by excluding the evidence in a
particular case.91 In theory, these categories are weighed and bal-
anced with no particular factor being determinative.
1. Fairness of the Trial
According to Justice Lamer, the fairness of the trial is dictated
by the type of evidence obtained as a result of a Charter breach.92
Real evidence that exists independent of the Charter violation will
rarely bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 93 However,
confessions and other evidence emanating from the accused will
render the trial unfair, since that evidence did not exist prior to the
violation of the Charter. More important, its admission at trial would
strike at "one of the fundamental traits of a fair trial, the right against
self-incrimination. ' ' 94 Justice Lamer recognized that a violation of
section 10(b) would most likely result in obtaining the type of evi-
dence that would render the trial unfair.
2. Seriousness of the Charter Breach
The seriousness of the Charter breach focuses on the conduct of
the authorities. On the one hand, if the police behaved in a deliberate,
willful, or flagrant manner, the evidence, regardless of its nature, will
91. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 285.
92. Id. at 284.
93. Id.
94. Id. In Canada, the concept of evidence emanating from the accused goes beyond the
traditional notion of testimonial self-incrimination and includes line-up identification and the
results of blood tests. See, e.g., R. v. Ross, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.) (line-up identification); R.
v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417 (Can.) (blood samples). In contrast, in the United States, line-
up identification is not self-incrimination within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. There-
fore, counsel is not required at a line-up conducted prior to indictment. See Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682 (1972). After indictment, the Sixth Amendment requires counsel at line-ups. See
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). Moreover, blood samples are not testimonial in
nature and may be seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1984). For a detailed compari-
son of these points, see Harvie & Foster, supra note 46.
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be excluded. On the other hand, if the police acted in good faith, or
the Charter violation was trivial or technical in nature, the evidence
will be admitted.9 5
3. Long-Term Effect of Exclusion on the
Administration of Justice
In this category, the seriousness of the offense and the long-term
effect of regularly admitting evidence is weighed against the severity
of the Charter violation. Justice Lamer suggested that evidence will
likely be admitted when the Charter violation is trivial and the offense
is serious.96 However, he pointed out that if the admission of evidence
would result in an unfair trial, because the evidence emanated from
the accused in violation of section 10(b), the seriousness of the offense
would not render the evidence admissible. This position minimizes
the importance of the third category when courts examine whether
they should exclude evidence emanating from an accused at criminal
trials.
V. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL, SELF-INCRIMINATION, AND THE
GOOD FAITH DOCTRINE
A. The American Position
The good faith exception in the United States is rooted in the
deterrent rationale. The exception assumes that officers acting under
a reasonable belief that their behavior is lawful cannot be deterred by
the threat of exclusion. 97 Where other values, such as fairness of the
trial and maintaining the integrity of the adversary system, are pro-
tected by the rule, the United States Supreme Court has not applied
95. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 285.
96. Id. Some American scholars have adopted a similar position. Professor Kaplan, for
example, argued that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should not apply to serious
crimes such as treason, espionage, murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping by organized
groups. He reasoned that evidence seized illegally during the investigation of these crimes
would be excluded if the constitutional violation was shocking under the Rochin standard.
John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1046 (1974); see
also James Duke Cameron & Richard Lustiger, The Exclusionary Rule: A Cost-Benefit Analy-
sis, 101 F.R.D. 109 (1984). At least one commentator criticized this proposal. See Yale
Kamisar, Comparative Reprehensibility and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1987).
97. Gary S. Goodpaster, Ending the Exclusionary Rule, 33 HAST. L. J. 1065 (1982). For
a discussion of the history of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, see Potter Stewart,
The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusion.
ary Rule in Search and Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365 (1983).
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the good faith doctrine. 98
Applying Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, the United States
Supreme Court refused to adopt a good faith exception to the Mi-
randa warnings.99 A confession obtained without the required Mi-
randa warning is presumed untrustworthy. It cannot be made
trustworthy by a good faith failure to administer the proper warn-
ing. 1oo The fair trial policy underlying the Sixth Amendment's exclu-
sionary rule provides a further constitutional basis, thereby leading
the Court to explicitly reject a good faith exception. 01
B. The Canadian Position
The Supreme Court of Canada has given section 24(2) a purpo-
sive interpretation, similar to enumerated legal rights. The logic of
this approach had led the Court to adopt an automatic rule of exclu-
sion whenever a violation of the right to retain and instruct counsel
results in evidence emanating from the accused. The values underly-
ing sections 10(b) and 24(2) are remarkably similar. The exclusionary
rule maintains the reputation of the system by ensuring a fair trial.
98. In Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), the United States Supreme Court used a
good faith argument in a Fifth Amendment case. The police interrogation occurred prior to
the Miranda decision, but the trial was conducted after the Miranda opinion was delivered.
Accordingly, the Miranda doctrine applied. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). The
Court held that the statement was admissible because the officers had acted in good faith by
giving a limited warning. The majority hinted in dicta that in the proper case there might be a
deterrent rationale for excluding evidence in a Fifth Amendment context.
99. Means other than applying the good faith doctrine have been used to limit Miranda's
impact. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (public safety exception); Duckworth
v. Egan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989) (loosening warning requirements); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429
U.S. 492 (1977) and Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (defining custody); Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (interpretation of an interrogation); Colorado v. Connelly,
479 U.S. 157 (1986), Colorado v. Springs, 479 U.S. 564 (1987), and Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412 (1986) (relaxing waiver requirements).
100. There is a deterrent rationale behind the Miranda warnings. In Oregon v. Elstad, 470
U.S. 298 (1985), Justice O'Connor mentioned the twin rationales of "trustworthiness and de-
terrent," but stated in dicta that "[w]e do not imply that good faith excuses a failure to admin-
ister Miranda warnings." Id. at 317.
101. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 159. In Moulton, the government argued that the police be-
haved in good faith by encouraging Moulton's codefendant to seek information from Moulton
about plans to kill a prosecution witness. The police did not intentionally seek information
from Moulton concerning the theft for which he was indicted, and took affirmative measures
to prevent the codefendant from inducing Moulton to make incriminating statements about
the theft. The majority of the Court argued that acceptance of a good faith exception in these
circumstances would invite the risk of fabricated investigations. Furthermore, police officers'
motives are difficult to determine when the police have more than one reason to investigate an
individual charged with a crime. More important, deliberately eliciting disclosures harms con-
stitutional interests in adversarial fair play. Id.
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Section 10(b) aims "at fostering the principles of adjudicative fair-
ness.' 0 2 Under this theory, it is axiomatic that if police officers fail to
observe the section 10(b) requirements and thereby conscript the ac-
cused against himself, the resulting evidence is excluded from trial.
The Court arrived at this conclusion by eschewing its own dis-
passionate person standard and by instead focusing on the reputation
of the system from the standpoint of a reasonable jurist.10 3 It seems
unlikely that a dispassionate Canadian, or American for that matter,
would hold the system of justice in disrepute simply because police
officers failed to warn a detainee of the right to retain and instruct
counsel, resulting in self-incriminating statements by the detainee.
Nevertheless, in the eyes of many jurists, this behavior is what brings
the system of justice into disrepute and assails the integrity of the
judicial process. 104
Neither the good faith conduct of the police, nor the seriousness
of the offense, can effectively weigh against the unfairness of admit-
ting evidence. Yet, the Court continues to examine the behavior of
police officers, labeling their failure to abide by section 10(b), regard-
less of the circumstances, as flagrant, willful, deliberate, or serious.
Even officers who relied in good faith on pre-Charter precedent have
had their behavior in violating section 10(b) described as
"flagrant."105
The Court may have foreclosed reliance on pre-Charter prece-
dent as an argument for good faith in right to silence cases and, by
implication, in section 10(b) cases. Justice Beverley McLachlin, writ-
ing for the majority in Hebert,0 6 examined the good faith issue in
section 24(2), stating: "It is said that the police acted in good faith,
102. Clarkson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 394.
103. Paciocco, supra note 80, at 329.
104. Id. Professor Paciocco concludes that in applying § 24(2), judges have placed them-
selves in the unique position of defining what conduct will bring the administration of justice
into disrepute. Id. at 327.
105. A good illustration of this point is found in R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613. The
events took place in late April 1982, two weeks after the patriation of the Constitution, when
the accused lost control of his motor vehicle and struck a tree. A police officer demanded a
breath test of the suspect. During the course of these events, the accused was not informed
that he had a right to retain and instruct counsel. The Crown relied on the pre-Charter case of
R. v. Chromiak, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 471 (Can.), wherein the Supreme Court of Canada held that a
demand for a breath test was not a detention within the meaning of the 1960 Bill of Rights.
Nevertheless, a majority of the Court reasoned that the failure of the officer to inform the
suspect of his right guaranteed by § 10(b) was a flagrant breach of the Charter and excluded
from evidence the results of the breath test.
106. [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 (Can.).
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relying on Rothman as authority to proceed as they did. However,
ignorance of the effect of the Charter does not preclude application of
24(2) of the Charter, nor does it cure an unfair trial." 10 7
VI. THE SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE AND THE
GOOD FAITH DOCTRINE
The previous analysis does not extend to evidence seized in viola-
tion of section 8 of the Charter. A violation of an individual's reason-
able expectation of privacy adversely affects neither the adversarial
nature of the system nor the fairness of the trial. Good faith, there-
fore, becomes the determinative factor as to whether the evidence will
be admitted at trial.
In Leon 10 8 and Krull,1°9 the United States Supreme Court lim-
ited the use of the good faith doctrine to situations where officers ac-
ted with objective and reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalid
search warrant or on a statute later declared unconstitutional. Like-
wise, Canadian jurists have used the good faith doctrine to justify ad-
mitting evidence where the law authorizing the search was found
unreasonable,' 10 or where the police did not provide sufficient infor-
mation to establish reasonable grounds, but where the magistrate is-
sued the search warrant nonetheless.111
A. Reliance on an Unconstitutional Statute
In five decisions, the Supreme Court of Canada used the good
faith rationale to admit evidence at trial when officers relied on stat-
utes later declared null and void or chose the wrong statutory author-
ity. In two decisions, Hamill1 1 2 and Sieben,1 3 R.C.M.P. officers used
writs of assistance authorized by section 10(3) of the Narcotic Control
Act.114 Although the government admitted that the use of writs of
assistance was unreasonable, the Crown successfully argued that the
107. Id. at 189.
108. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
109. 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
110. R. v. Hamill, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 310 (Can.); R. v. Sieben, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 295 (Can.).
111. R. v. Pastro, 42 C.C.C.3d 485 (Sask. C.A. 1988); R. v. Turcotte, 39 C.C.C.3d 193
(Sask. C.A. 1987); R. v. Harris & Lighthouse Video Centres, Ltd., 35 C.C.C.3d 1 (Ont. C.A.
1987).
112. [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 307.
113. [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 297.
114. The section, which the legislature subsequently repealed, provided that "[a] judge of
the Federal Court of Canada shall, upon application by the Minister, issue a writ of assistance
authorizing and empowering the person named therein, aided and assisted by such person as
1992]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 14:779
officers acted in good faith because they relied on a statute that they
did not know violated the Charter.
In R. v. Duarte" 5 and R. v. Wiggins,116 police officers recorded
conversations relying on a statute permitting the interception of pri-
vate communication without judicial authorization. The statute also
required the consent of the originator or intended recipient for the
interception to be proper.1 7 The Supreme Court of Canada declared
that the statute violated section 8 of the Charter insofar as it allowed
state agents to monitor conversations without prior judicial authoriza-
tion. In both cases, the Court admitted the conversations under sec-
tion 24(2), reasoning that the officers acted within the scope of a
statute that they believed was valid."18
In R. v. Lamb," 9 a police officer, intending to search for narcot-
ics, obtained a search warrant from a magistrate under the authority
of section 44312° of the Criminal Code, notwithstanding that he was
investigating an alleged violation of the Narcotic Control Act. The
officer testified that he sought the warrant under the authority of the
Criminal Code because he learned during a training course that the
provisions in the Narcotic Control Act providing for warrantless
searches were of dubious constitutional validity,' 2' and that recent
amendments to the Criminal Code validated search warrants for nar-
the person named therein may require, at any time, to enter any dwelling house and search for
narcotics." Id. at 298.
115. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Can.).
116. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 62 (Can.).
117. Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. 50, § 178(11)(1) (1974) (Can.). In Duarte, the monitoring
took place in an apartment. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 36. In Wiggins, the officer wore a
"body pack." Wiggins, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 65.
118. Duarte, (1990] 1 S.C.R. at 59-60; Wiggins, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 68. The Court did not
characterize the conversations as emanating from the accused, but this is the type of evidence
that has been excluded when a violation of § 10(b) has occurred. Professor Paciocco suggests
that these decisions may represent a retreat from the absolute rule of exclusion when evidence
emanates from the accused. Paciocco, supra note 80, at 360. In a narrow sense, this sugges-
tion is correct, but the decisions are consistent with the Court's enforcement of its fair trial
policy. Significantly, neither Duarte nor Wiggins was detained nor entitled to counsel. As
such, the underlying values protected by § 10(b), fairness of the trial and protection of the
adversary system, were not compromised.
119. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1036 (Can.).
120. Now § 487.
121. The officer intended to search the suspect's home and outbuilding. The Narcotic
Control Act permits a warrantless search in premises other than the suspect's residence. See
supra note 23. The opinion is unclear as to what kind of training course the officer attended.
The Alberta Court of Appeal neither addressed the sufficiency of the training nor developed a
standard for training.
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cotic offenses. 122 Although the Alberta Court of Appeal held the
search unreasonable, the justices admitted the evidence under section
24(2) because the officer relied in good faith on his training. The
Supreme Court of Canada, in a short opinion, simply stated that the
appellate court committed no error in admitting the evidence.
In four of the five cases--Sieben,123 Duarte,124 Wiggins, 125 and
Lamb 126-a finding of good faith was supported by the fact that the
officers had reasonable grounds for the search but relied on statutory
procedures that the Court later declared unconstitutional or inappro-
priate. In Hamill, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for a
determination of whether the officer had reasonable grounds to con-
duct the search. 127 These decisions differ sharply from the facts in
Krull where the officer lacked probable cause, but the evidence was
nonetheless admitted because he acted in good faith reliance on the
statute. 128
B. Search Warrants Obtained Without Reasonable Grounds
The Supreme Court of Canada has not addressed the issue of
whether officers can, in good faith, rely on a magistrate's conclusion
that reasonable grounds existed for issuing a search warrant that is
later determined to be based on insufficient information. Provincial
courts examining the problem have reached different conclusions.
The Ontario Court of Appeal accepted the rationale articulated by the
majority of the United States Supreme Court in Leon, holding that
122. As it turned out, the officer's training was sound. The Supreme Court of Canada in
R. v. Multiform Manufacturing Co., 58 C.C.C.3d 257 (1990), held that amendments to the
search warrant provisions of the Criminal Code were applicable to any federal statute regard-
less of whether the statute contained its own search and seizure provisions. See supra note 28.
123. [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 295.
124. [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 30.
125. [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 62.
126. [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1036.
127. Hamill, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 307.
128. In DeFillippo, the United States Supreme Court distinguished the unconstitutional
statutes that do not directly authorize an arrest and unconstitutional laws that, on their face,
do not satisfy the warrant or probable cause standard of the Fourth Amendment. De Fillippo,
443 U.S. at 39. Under the second type of statute, good faith of the officer would not make a
search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979);
WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.2,
at 609 (1986). According to the decision in Krull, evidence is admissible regardless of whether
the statute is described as "substantive" or "procedural" if the officer was acting in objective
good faith. Krull, 480 U.S. at 346, 353. Today, it is inconceivable that a reasonably well-
trained officer in the United States would not think that a "procedural" statute permitting
searches without probable cause or a warrant is unconstitutional.
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officers could rely on the magistrate's determination that reasonable
grounds existed.1 29 Unlike the United States Supreme Court in Leon,
the Ontario court stressed that officers were in possession of facts that,
if presented to the magistrate, would have been sufficient to establish
reasonable grounds for the search.
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal took a different position. In
R. v. Pastro,30 a search was declared unreasonable because the infor-
mation in the warrant application did not establish reasonable
grounds.13 1 The justices commented that if evidence establishing rea-
sonable grounds existed, the officer should have provided it to the
magistrate, and if the evidence did not exist, the officer failed to follow
well-established procedures in applying for the warrant. In either
event, the court reasoned, good faith is relevant only when examining
the manner in which the search is carried out and not in the failure of
the police to provide the magistrate with sufficient information to es-
tablish probable cause. 132
Errors on the face of a search warrant may also render a search
unreasonable, but if the defects are a result of an oversight, the evi-
dence will be admitted. In R. v. Parent,33 evidence was admitted
although the address was inadvertently omitted from the search war-
rant when the officers' application for the warrant contained the ad-
dress. The Yukon Territory Court of Appeal declared the search
unreasonable, but concluded that the officers acted in good faith. The
court reasoned that the oversight was a mere administrative error
that, in eyes of a reasonable dispassionate person, would not bring the
administration of justice into disrepute.
129. Harris & Lighthouse Video Centres, 35 C.C.C.3d at 23.
130. 42 C.C.C.3d 485 (Sask. C.A. 1988).
131. Officers prepared the warrant application using information from a confidential in-
formant, but failed to establish the basis of the informant's information or substantiate his
credibility. This approach is similar to the two-pronged test developed in Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). Gates overruled these
decisions replacing the two-pronged test with a totality of the circumstances test to establish
probable cause. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
132. In Turcotte, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal again held that the good faith doc-
trine applies only to the manner in which the search is carried out. Turcotte, 39 C.C.C.3d at
210-11. This does not mean that the court would use the good faith doctrine to admit evidence
obtained from a search conducted in an unreasonable manner, but it may use good faith to
admit evidence seized by authority of a search warrant containing a technical defect.
133. 47 C.C.C.3d 385 (Y.T.C.A. 1989). Parent is factually similar to Sheppard. See supra
note 3 and accompanying text.
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C. Exceptions to the Good Faith Doctrine
Justice Byron White, writing for the United States Supreme
Court majority in Leon, stated that evidence would be suppressed in
situations where the search warrant was so facially defective that a
reasonable officer would not presume it to be valid, where the magis-
trate was misled by false information, and where the magistrate aban-
doned his neutral role.134 Canadian courts have also refused to apply
the good faith doctrine in similar situations. Furthermore, a finding
of good faith seems unlikely where the manner of the search-the
physical way in which it was carried out-was unreasonable.
35
1. Defective Search Warrants
The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that police officers are
expected to know the essential components of a valid search warrant.
In R. v. Genest,1 36 a warrant was issued under section 10 of the Nar-
cotic Control Act. The form warrant did not name the officer in
charge of the search, nor the hours it could be executed, nor the ob-
jects to be seized.137 The Crown admitted that the search was unrea-
sonable, but justified admission of the evidence under section 24(2) on
the theory that the officers acted in good faith. The Supreme Court
rejected this argument on the ground that the warrant was so facially
inadequate that the officers should have been alert to its
deficiencies. 138
2. Misleading Information
In R. v. Donaldson,139 the British Columbia Court of Appeal con-
sidered the admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of a search
warrant issued on the basis of misleading information. A R.C.M.P.
officer, in an application for a search warrant, used the phrase "relia-
134. Leon, 468 U.S. at 293.
135. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 981; see Bradley, supra note 2 (discussing the distinction be-
tween good faith before obtaining the warrant versus good faith after issuance).
136. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 59 (Can.).
137. Id. at 73. The warrant in this case violated the version of § 10(2) of the Narcotic
Control Act that was in force at the time of the case. The section read, in part: "A justice who
is satisfied by information upon oath that there is a narcotic ... in any dwelling-house may
issue a warrant under his hand authorizing a peace officer named therein at any time to enter
the dwelling house and search for narcotics." [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 65. The warrant also con-
tained a number of blank spaces. Id. at 73.
138. Id. at 87. The Court also held that the deficiencies in the warrant, coupled with the
unreasonable manner in conducting the search, demonstrated a lack of good faith. Id. at 91.
139. 58 C.C.C.3d 294 (B.C.C.A. 1990).
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ble confidential sources" instead of disclosing that his knowledge was
obtained from the questionable interception of private communica-
tions. 140 The trial judge found that the failure to inform the magis-
trate of the meaning of the phrase was deceptive because the
magistrate believed that the phrase referred to a typical police inform-
ant.14 1 On appeal, the Crown admitted the section 8 violation but
argued that the evidence should not be excluded. 142 The appellate
court disagreed and emphasized that because warrant applications are
made ex parte, it is essential that magistrates are not deliberately
deceived by the police.143 The justices emphasized that quashing war-
rants and excluding evidence is not done to punish the police, but "to
avoid the corruption of the judicial process which would result if de-
liberate efforts to mislead judicial officers in the discharge of their ju-
dicial functions could nonetheless lead to valid judicial orders.","
3. Magistrates Abandon Their Proper Role
Sometimes officers will present a warrant application to a specific
magistrate because he will "rubber stamp" it without applying the
requisite scrutiny. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held a search
unreasonable because the warrant was issued by a justice of the peace
who was not a neutral and impartial magistrate as required by section
10(2) of the Narcotic Control Act.145 The justice of the peace was a
member of the Corps of Commissionaires with specific duties of traffic
enforcement at the Regina airport. The R.C.M.P. constable in charge
of the airport detachment supervised and disciplined members of the
corp assigned to traffic enforcement.' 46 Under these circumstances,
the court refused to apply the good faith doctrine and asked whether
"good faith [can] be said to exist where the course of conduct points
to an obvious selection process of obtaining search warrants." 147
140. Id. at 301. Crown officials were concerned that if they divulged their source of infor-
mation, it would substantially affect their ability to carry on the investigation. Id.
141. Id. at 310.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 311.
144. Donaldson, 58 C.C.C.3d at 311 (quoting R. v. Sismey, 55 C.C.C.3d 281, 285
(B.C.C.A. 1990)).
145. Pastro, 42 C.C.C.3d at 490.
146. In Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979), the magistrate abandoned his
neutral and detached role when he went with the police and made an item-by-item determina-
tion of what evidence could be seized.
147. Pastro, 42 C.C.C.3d at 546.
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4. Unreasonable Manner in Executing Searches
Where the manner of the search is physically abusive or violates
bodily integrity, the good faith rationale is insufficient to admit the
evidence. In Hamill, the police applied a chokehold to the suspect,
and the Supreme Court of Canada sent the case back to the trial court
to determine whether the police officer, in addition to having reason-
able grounds to conduct the search, had sufficient reason for applying
the hold. 148 The Court cautioned that if there was no justification for
the manner of the search, the chokehold would be unreasonable and
the evidence inadmissible, notwithstanding the officer's good faith re-
liance on a law later declared unconstitutional.1 49
In R. v. Genest,150 a small army of officers used a battering ram to
enter a home pursuant to a defective search warrant only five weeks
after the officers conducted a similar search of the home.15' Accord-
ing to the Court, the method of entry, the previous search, and the
officers' reliance on a defective warrant suggested the officers' ulterior
motives and a continuing abuse of police power. 5 2
The Supreme Court of Canada has avoided applying the good
faith rationale in cases where the manner of the search violated a sus-
pect's bodily integrity. In R. v. Greffe,153 the Court declined to find a
good faith belief of the officers where a rectal search was conducted
after an arrest for traffic offenses. 154 Similarly, the Court has refused
to apply the good faith doctrine in situations where the violation of
bodily integrity was less intrusive. In Pohoretsky, the defendant was
convicted of impaired driving, under section 236 of the Criminal
Code.1 55 A physician, at the request of a police officer, obtained a
blood sample from the incoherent driver. The issue before the Court
was whether this act of taking a driver's blood sample was authorized.
According to the Manitoba Blood Test Act, the physician's act was
148. Hamill, [1987] 1 S.C.R. at 308.
149. Id. The Court did not determine whether the manner of the search was reasonable
because it was not a ground upon which exclusion was argued. Id. The Court suggested that
if Hamill was a violent person who had assaulted police officers in the past, then applying the
chokehold was reasonable. Id. In R. v. Rao, 12 C.C.C.3d 97, 102 (Ont. C.A. 1984), officers
physically assaulted the accused in the course of searching his home. This action made the
search unreasonable, and good faith was not an issue. Id. at 127.
150. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 59 (Can.).
151. Id. at 66-67.
152. Id. at 88.
153. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 755 (Can.).
154. Id. at 758.
155. R. v. Pohoretsky, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 945, 947 (Can.).
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proper, 56 but section 237 of the Criminal Code prohibited the taking
of blood for chemical analysis without consent. In resolving this con-
flict, the Court concluded that the search was unreasonable and ex-
cluded evidence of the blood test on that basis. 157 The Court reasoned
that the officer did not act in good faith because he should have
known that the Manitoba Blood Test Act was contrary to the Crimi-
nal Code and, therefore, was of no force or effect. 58
In addition, an officer's good faith was insufficient to allow evi-
dence of blood test results obtained by a doctor who, for medical pur-
poses, held a vial under a free flowing wound to collect a blood
sample.' 59 After the suspect disclosed to the doctor that he had con-
sumed a beer and some antihistamine tablets, the doctor turned over
the blood sample to a police officer. '0 The officer had neither re-
quested the sample nor was aware that blood had been taken.16' Nev-
ertheless, the Court concluded that the seizure, in the absence of some
compelling reason or statutory authority, violated the defendant's
personal autonomy. 6
2
These rulings indicate that the courts rarely allow the good faith
doctrine as a justification for admitting evidence seized when officers
were aware of substantive defects in the search warrant, when they
provided the magistrate with misleading information, when they fo-
rum shopped to obtain the search warrant, and when they conducted
the search in an unreasonable manner. 6 3 Furthermore, the Greffe,
156. Id. at 947. Manitoba's Blood Test Act permits the taking of blood without consent if
the doctor has reasonable grounds to believe that the individual has been driving a car during
the preceding two hours. Id.
157. Id. at 949-50. The Crown conceded before the Supreme Court that taking the blood
sample was unreasonable for two reasons. Id. at 948. First, the police officer did not establish
the necessary legal grounds pursuant to Manitoba's Blood Test Act. Id. Second, the Act was
irrelevant in criminal prosecutions because the defendant was charged under the Criminal
Code, and provinces have no jurisdiction to legislate with respect to criminal matters. Id; see
supra note 7.
158. Hamill, Sieben, Duarte, Wiggins, and Lamb differ from Pohoretsky because the of-
ficers acted within the authority of the Criminal Code and would not have known that the law
violated the Charter. See MacCrimmon, supra note 23, at 252.
159. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 422.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 431-32. There are now detailed provisions in the Canadian Criminal Code for
taking blood samples. Criminal Law Amendment Act, R.S.C., ch. C-46, §§ 252-61 (1985)
(Can.).
163. An exception, for example, is the notorious case of R. v. Legere, 43 C.C.C.3d 502
(N.B.C.A. 1988). The New Brunswick Court of Appeal admitted into evidence hair samples
that were taken by force from the accused in violation of § 8. The court felt that the officers
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Pohoretsky, and Dyment decisions signal the Supreme Court of Can-
ada's willingness to protect bodily integrity, the most significant value
protected by section 8, as evidenced by the Court's strict enforcement
of the exclusionary rule for violation of bodily integrity without prior
judicial or statutory authority.
D. Unreasonable Searches or Seizures Without Warrants
The most vexing problem surrounding the good faith doctrine
occurs in warrantless searches. Such situations arise when officers
conduct a warrantless search, believing they have reasonable grounds,
but it is later determined that they did not. American commentators,
focusing on the deterrent rationale, argue that extending the good
faith exception to warrantless searches dilutes the standard of prob-
able cause and makes the warrant process less attractive to the po-
lice.164 In contrast, it is unclear whether the Supreme Court of
Canada will apply the good faith doctrine in warrantless searches,
but, in two cases examining this issue, they did not apply the
doctrine. 
65
In Greffe, the R.C.M.P., acting on an informant's tip and a fol-
low-up investigation, alerted customs authorities at the Calgary air-
port that the accused was transporting heroin into the country.
16 6
Customs officials detained Greffe, and without informing him of his
right to counsel, conducted a body search. 167 No drugs were discov-
ered, and Greffe was turned over to the R.C.M.P.168 Constables then
advised Greffe that he was under arrest for unpaid traffic tickets.
69
He was informed of his right to retain and instruct counsel and that
acted in good faith because, before extracting the samples, they had consulted with Crown
counsel, who apparently informed them that taking hair samples did not violate the Charter.
164. Dripps, supra note 2, at 907.
165. In R. v. MacDonald, 44 C.C.C.3d 134 (P.E.I.C.A. 1990), the Court of Appeal for
Prince Edward Island held that an officer's behavior in stopping, searching, and seizing narcot-
ics from a suspect without a warrant and without reasonable grounds was high-handed, illegal,
and unwarranted.
166. Greffe, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 772.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 773. One of the Charter violations in Greffe was the failure of the officers to
accurately advise Greffe why he was being arrested. Section 10(a) of the Charter requires that
persons detained or arrested be informed promptly of the reasons for their detainment. The
officer had written in his notebook that the arrest was for a traffic offense. Id. One constable
testified that he had an independent recollection that he told Greffe that he was being arrested
for a narcotics violation. The trial court, however, found that the traffic arrest was the stated
reason for the detention. Id.
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he would be subjected to a body search by a doctor.170 At the hospi-
tal, a physician gave Greffe a rectal examination and discovered a
quantity of narcotics.' 71 The R.C.M.P. constables testified that the
informant's tip and their subsequent investigation revealed a descrip-
tion of Greffe, the flight he was on, the clothes he was wearing, and
that he had narcotics in his possession.
72
The Crown admitted that the officers' information was insuffi-
cient to establish reasonable grounds as required by section 8 of the
Charter, but argued that the evidence should be admitted under sec-
tion 24(2). 173 In his section 24(2) analysis, Justice Lamer, writing for
the majority, found that the officers did not have reasonable grounds
to conduct the search. 174 Although the events occurred in 1984, prior
to decisions in Charter cases, Justice Lamer reasoned that the cumu-
lative effect of the two Charter violations of sections 8 and 10, in addi-
tion to the use of the traffic arrest as a vehicle to conduct the rectal
examination, gave rise to an inference of bad faith, and thus the evi-
dence was suppressed.
175
170. Id. at 772-73.
171. Greffe, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 773.
172. Id. at 766-67. The Crown declined the trial judge's invitation to elicit more testimony
about what led the constables to believe that Greffe was carrying narcotics. There was no
evidence, for example, about the informant's reliability or how the officers knew that the sus-
pect swallowed a balloon. Id. at 792.
173. Id. at 786-87. The Crown frequently admits Charter violations. But in Greffe, the
Crown may have made a tactical error. The dissent argued that officers had reasonable
grounds to conduct the search for narcotics, notwithstanding the fact that they arrested Greffe
on a traffic warrant. A cursory reading of provincial appellate court opinions reveals a dis-
turbing trend. Courts frequently assume the Charter violation and quickly focus on § 24(2).
To the extent that this is true, the development of jurisprudence for substantive Charter sec-
tions is weakened.
174. In Greffe, the Court signaled that it might move away from the proportionality test
outlined in Collins. [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 793. The decision elevated the "seriousness of the
Charter breach" to a determinative role in exclusion decisions. The Court suggested that the
facts of each case will determine which of the three Collins factors it will emphasize. P.
Michael Bolton, Q.C., & Chris Tollefson, The Exclusion of Real Evidence Under §§ 24(2) of
the Charter, 48 THE ADVOCATE 343 (1990).
175. Greffe, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 758 ("No urgency or immediacy to prevent loss of evi-
dence.").
The dissent vigorously argued that the officers had sufficiently reasonable grounds to con-
duct the search within the meaning of § 8 and, moreover, the officers acted in good faith
because the search occurred before the Supreme Court announced any Charter decisions ana-
lyzing searches at the border. Id. at 767-68. In the United States, customs officials can detain
individuals at the border when they have reasonable suspicion, as opposed to probable cause.
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 531. The United States
Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of what burden is required when conducting a
1992] Exclusionary Rule and Good Faith Exception
In R. v. Kokesch, 176 police officers, acting without reasonable
grounds, conducted a perimeter search of the accused's home. 177
They observed a piece of plywood nailed to the wall of the residence
covering a metal vent, and, from the side of the plywood, they de-
tected the odor of marijuana, as well as heat, coming from the area. 178
Based on these observations, the officers obtained a search warrant for
the home and seized a number of marijuana plants. 179
The Supreme Court of Canada held that conducting the search
prior to obtaining the search warrant was unreasonable, and excluded
the evidence from trial. 80 Distinguishing the cases of Duarte, Wig-
gins, Hamill, and Sieben, Justice John Sopinka emphasized that the
police improperly trespassed on the accused's private property with-
out statutory authority.' 8' Even though no express law prohibited the
search, Justice Sopinka stated that the police officers were aware, or
should have been aware, that common law and case precedent prohib-
ited this police activity. 182 Therefore, under these circumstances, the
police did not act in good faith.
VII. STANDARD OF GOOD FAITH
The Supreme Court of Canada has indicated that the concept of
rectal examination at the border. Given the intrusive nature of such a search, more justifica-
tion than mere suspicion may be necessary. LAFAVE, supra note 128, § 10.5, at 286-88.
176. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
177. Id. at 9.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 10.
180. Id. at 18.
181. Kokesch, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 33-34. The Narcotic Control Act, under which the inves-
tigation was authorized, permits warrantless searches other than in a suspect's home. The Act,
however, requires that the police have reasonable grounds before conducting a warrantless
search. See supra note 23.
182. Kokesch, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 33. According to the Court, two pre-Charter cases pre-
cluded the argument that the police had common law authority to trespass on the private
property of the suspect to conduct a search, and the police knew about or should have been
aware of these two cases. Id. at 33-34 (citing Eccles v. Bourque, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 739 (Can.);
Colet v. The Queen, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 2 (Can.)).
In Kokesch, the Supreme Court of Canada admitted the possibility that good faith reli-
ance on previous case precedent may be sufficient to admit evidence that does not affect the
fairness of the trial. Id. at 22. It seems logical that if officers should have been aware of cases
prohibiting trespass, they may rely in good faith on pre-Charter cases permitting conduct that
otherwise might violate § 8. Justice Sopinka seems to have suggested this outcome when he
reasoned that "[t]he question of the length of time after a judgment that ought to be permitted
to pass before knowledge of its content is attributed to the police for the purposes of assessing
good faith is an interesting one, but it does not arise on these facts." Id. at 33.
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good faith requires an assessment of reasonableness.18 3 But, there are
two tests of reasonableness that determine the standard of good faith,
an objective reasonableness test and a subjective test that takes into
consideration the reasonableness of the officer's beliefs.'
8 4
The objective reasonableness standard was adopted by the
United States Supreme Court in Leon. The Court required that the
activities of the police be measured by a hypothetical well-trained po-
lice officer. Though the Supreme Court of Canada has yet to follow
this standard expressly, its decisions are consistent with the test ap-
plied in the United States. Under this objective test, a reasonable of-
ficer would not know that writs of assistance were unconstitutional,
but the officer should, nonetheless, realize that a provincial law has no
effect if it contradicts the Criminal Code. Moreover, a reasonable of-
ficer should know the facial requirements of a valid search warrant
and could rely on the officer's training, previous case precedents, and
departmental policies, as well as Crown counsel, to guide his or her
activities. 185
Good faith, as a subjective notion, requires an examination of the
beliefs and motives of the officers and a judgment about the reasona-
bleness of those beliefs.18 6 The Ontario Court of Appeal defined good
faith in this way in R. v. Harris & Lighthouse Video Centres, Ltd. '
8 7
In that case, the officer's preparation of the warrant fell below a rea-
sonably competent standard, but the officer honestly and reasonably
believed that she had presented the magistrate with reasonable
grounds for a search.188 In permitting the evidence at trial, the court
183. Ross, [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 17.
184. MacCrimmon, supra note 23, at 255-56. It is unlikely that the court will accept a
standard that examines the beliefs and motives of officers without regard to the reasonableness
of those beliefs. Such a standard would enthrone the private judgments of every police officer.
Id. at 257-58.
185. Dripps argues that a well-trained officer would not seek a warrant from a magistrate
until he or she had conducted a significant independent investigation and secured an internal
screening of the warrant application from a departmental superior or lawyer. See Dripps,
supra note 2, at 930-31.
186. Some scholars argue that the Leon decision concerns a mistake of law rather than
good faith. See Bradley, supra note 3. Bradley argues that Leon will have a major impact on
negligent mistake of law cases, but not on good faith cases. See id. at 295-96. Similarly,
Misner argues that the good faith exception was analogous to the mistake of law defense.
Robert L. Misner, Limiting Leon: A Mistake of Law Analogy, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
507, 509 (1986).
187. 35 C.C.C.3d 1 (Ont. C.A. 1987).
188. Id. at 28. The Ontario Court of Appeal emphasized that the officer was in possession
of facts that, had she presented them to the magistrate, would have resulted in the issuance of a
valid search warrant. Id.
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rejected the objective reasonableness test, but cautioned that it would
not reward ignorance. 89 Ignorance of proper procedure might be so
glaring, the court stated, that it would bring the administration of
justice into disrepute. 90
Although the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions are consis-
tent with the objective reasonableness test developed in Leon, the
Court's willingness to make judgments about the motives and beliefs
of officers suggests that it will accept the Ontario Court of Appeal's
standard of good faith. Of course, the reasonableness of those beliefs
will become central to the Court's finding of good faith.' 9'
VIII. CONCLUSION
Canadian judges examined section 24(2) and discovered that its
purpose mirrored their judicial values regarding fairness of the trial
and maintenance of the adversary system. The reputation of the sys-
tem, they believe, depends upon the exclusion of evidence when its
admission contravenes those values. Had they looked into their com-
munities, they would have discovered that the reasonable and dispas-
sionate person does not hold the system in disrepute in every case in
which those values are impugned. Nevertheless, having started down
the road of enforcing judicial norms, perhaps Canadian courts should
embrace Justice Sopinka's dictum that the fairness of the trial and
seriousness of the violation "are alternative grounds for the exclusion
189. Id. at 27. The Ontario court also rejected the objectively reasonable test. See R. v.
Moran, 36 C.C.C.3d 225 (Ont. C.A. 1987); R. v. Woolley, 40 C.C.C.3d 531 (Ont. C.A. 1988).
190. Harris & Lighthouse Video Centres, 35 C.C.C.3d at 27. Appellate courts place weight
on an officer's experience and position within the organization. See Pastro, 42 C.C.C.3d at 522.
In R. v. Rhodenbush, 21 C.C.C.3d 423, 427 (B.C.C.A. 1985), the British Columbia Court of
Appeal suggested that superior officers are deemed to have more knowledge about the Charter
than their subordinates.
191. Perhaps the best example of the Court's use of the subjective state of mind in non-
exclusion cases is found in Storrey. In determining the standard to be applied in assessing
whether an arrest violates § 9, the Court adopted an objective and subjective test. Storrey,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. at 251-52. The objective test is whether a "reasonable person standing in the
shoes of the police officer would have believed that reasonable and probable grounds existed to
make an arrest." Id. at 250. The subjective test examines the motives of the arresting officer.
In this case, there was no indication that the police officer demonstrated bias toward persons of
different race, nationality, or color, or that there was enmity between the officer and the person
arrested. Id. at 251-52. "These factors, if established," the Court cautioned, "might have the
effect of rendering invalid an otherwise lawful arrest." Id. at 252. The rule in the United
States is different. LAFAVE, supra note 128, § 1.4, at 80. In Scott v. United States, 436 U.S.
128, 138-39 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment re-
quires only an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and circum-
stances known to him or her.
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of evidence, and not alternative grounds for the admission of evidence.
It seems odd indeed to assert that the admission of evidence which
would render a trial unfair ought to be admitted because the police
officer thought he was doing his job." 192
In addition, another automatic rule of exclusion lurks on the ho-
rizon in cases in which the physical manner of the search was unrea-
sonable. Under such circumstances, reasonable acts of good faith by
the police can rarely overcome the disrepute of the system if the evi-
dence is admitted.
So, what is left for the application of the good faith doctrine?
First, the good faith rationale will continue to have its impact when
the only issue is the admissibility of real evidence or evidence that
does not impugn the fairness of the trial. Second, the Supreme Court
of Canada may find that officers act in good faith in conducting a
warrantless search when they believe they have reasonable grounds,
but in fact do not. Third, the Supreme Court of Canada will continue
to use the good faith doctrine to determine the admissibility of evi-
dence in a narrow range of cases, similar to those decided by the
United States Supreme Court, where there is either insufficient infor-
mation in the application to provide the magistrate with reasonable
grounds, but the magistrate nevertheless issues the search warrant, or
where officers conducted a search relying on a statute later declared
unconstitutional. In either event, the Supreme Court of Canada, un-
like the Supreme Court of the United States, will apply the good faith
exception only if it is established that officers had facts in their posses-
sion that gave them reasonable grounds to conduct the search or to
obtain the warrant.
192. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 207-08. Recently, the Supreme Court of Canada adopted
Justice Sopinka's dictum when it excluded a confession because of a breach of § 10(b). R. v.
Elshaw, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 24 (Can.).
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